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When psychologists try to use a philosophy to expose a ‚new‛ psyche and develop a new 
technique for changing one’s behavior they tend to reduce the marvelously enigmatic human 
to fit their Procrustean bed.  They chop off the mystery to fit their theory.  This power play to 
support an ideology ultimately sabotages its efforts to illuminate the awesomely elusive and 
irreducible psyche.  Paul Marcus does not try to reduce the rich insights of Emmanuel Levinas 
to conjure up a theory or design a practice.  When he calls for a ‚Levinasian-inspired, ethi-
cally-infused psychoanalytic approach‛ to face everyday problems, he challenges the tradi-
tion’s chronic habits of ego-centrism by honoring de-centering humility as the paradoxical 
path to a good and happy life, the basis of holiness.  Levinas was more interested in the good-
ness of holiness than in ethics as a code for moral conduct.  Both Marcus and Levinas risk 
being dismissed by psychologists for attending to holiness.  Yes, Levinas wants a kind of uto-
pia.  Not one without suffering and conflict, but one where we would respond responsibly 
when called by the neediness and worthiness of the Other toward a transcendent ‚nowhere 
place,‛ while simultaneously being pulled toward a ‚here-and-now place‛ of natural selfish-
ness.  From Levinas, Marcus finds the basis for a Copernican revolution for psychoanalysis by 
removing the self from its center to recognize the Other at the center.  Paradoxically, the self is 
served when serving others, not with the intent to serve the self, but by authentically serving 
the one who has priority over the self.  While this Levinasian-infused psychoanalysis could be 
what Foucault called a ‚technology of the self,‛ it is less a technology to change personal ha-
bits and more what he describes as a ‚transformation into a mode of being.‛  
Marcus must convince his readers to pay attention to this Levinas with his extravagant 
descriptions of the priority of the Other: ‚The psyche in the soul is the other in me.‛1 ‚It is ma-
ternity, gestation of the other in the same [i.e., self]…:‛2  
 
This other-in-the-self is bearing par excellence, bearing even for the responsibility for the 
pain brought on by the Other. (75)  
                                                 
1 Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence. translated by Alphonso Lingis from Autre-
ment qu’être ou au-delà de l’essence, first published in 1974 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1981), 
69.     
2
 Ibid, 75. 
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It is not an abdication of the (self), now alienated and slave to the Other, but an abnegation 
of oneself fully responsible for the other. (68-69)  
 
To be oneself, is the state of being a hostage, always to have one degree of responsibility 
more, the responsibility for the responsibility of the other… (84)   
 
This is strong stuff.  With this Marcus points toward the good life by using the following defi-
nition of goodness from Levinas, ‚…taking up a position such that the Other counts more than 
myself.‛3  These passages make Levinas seem like a grump leaving out the fun and pleasure of 
the good life.  Au contraire, he has beautiful sections on enjoyment: 
 
We live from ‘good soup.’ …living from… delineates independence itself, the indepen-
dence of enjoyment and of its happiness… Enjoyable objects make up the grace of life… 
enjoyment is the ultimate consciousness of all the contents that fill my life—it embraces 
them… Life is the love of life.4   
 
Loyal to Freudian vocabulary Marcus insists that this Levinas alternative could inspire clients 
suffering from Narcissism by helping ‚…the analysand awaken to a moral life that is coter-
minous with the discovery of the Other as the first to be respected, and served.‛ (xiv)  He 
challenges the established master narratives of psychoanalysis that define the self as the plea-
sure seeker (Freud), the object seeker (Klein and Fairbain), and meaning seeker (Schaefer and 
Spence).  Marcus points out to contemporary narrators that the self is not at its best as a seeker, 
but as the one who responds responsibly to the Other by placing her above himself.  Parado-
xically, the self finds its identity not by obsessively self-searching, but being distracted from 
itself by attending to others.  This Levinasian inspiration is nothing short of a radical paradigm 
shift to save the goodness of the massive teetering edifice of psychoanalysis.  Fundamentalist 
Freudianism is its own worst enemy, as is fundamentalist Behaviorism, fundamentalist Cog-
nitivism, fundamentalist Physiologism, and especially fundamentalist Utilitarianism with its 
evidence-based practices: methods that mangle mystery and manipulate for other motives. 
What does In Search of the Good Life offer to a wide sweep of readers, with its repeated 
intention to offer ‚…a Levinasian-inspired, ethically-infused psychoanalytic approach…‛ to 
the good life?  How reach beyond analytic colleagues? 
First, he does convince us that this distinctive philosophy cannot be dismissed as too 
abstract and too hard to live by, a too frequent criticism.  Without a radical ethical philosophy 
we ‚fall into‛ ego-centricism and reduce others to nothing more than sources for our grati-
fication of needs for companionship, friendship, love, and intimacy, and thereby violate the 
dignity and independent worthiness of others.  We tend, for our convenience, to dismiss 
others to less than who they are from being ‚always more than‛ the labels we use to reduce 
them to ‚nothing more than‛ the stereotypical caricatures we construct for target-practice.  
Psychotherapists facing the enigmatic Other ought to know better, but are often the most 
guilty of doing so. 
                                                 
3 Ibid., 247. 
4 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity. Translated by Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University 
Press, 1969), 110-115. 
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In Chapter Five: ‚Guard your tongue,‛ Marcus clearly discloses the self-sabotage of 
reductionism.  He unpacks ‚the psychological meaning of gossip‛ with its two poles of con-
structive and destructive ‚information exchange.‛  Without the ethical intent to serve, the gos-
siper damages his co-gossiper as well as his gossipee.  For his own advantage he tries to se-
duce a co-conspirator into membership with ‚helpful information‛ by passing-on ‚secret and 
socially significant‛ knowledge.  But the gossiper hurts more than the gossipee and co-gos-
siper; he also hurts himself by deceiving himself, and risks turning listeners away.  Better than 
the Valiant Little Tailor: three victims with one blow. 
Second, he gives a lucid explication of Levinas’s philosophy.  Straight-up Levinas is 
hard to read.  His are not logical treatises, but more like poetic evocations inviting readers to 
dig into their experience deeper than they are accustomed to or even want to.  While not un-
commonly does a reader discover this philosophy to be ‚what I’ve been waiting for,‛ a com-
mon sense such as Grandma taught at her knee, it is painfully challenging; it disturbs; it calls 
into question the reader’s comfortable prejudices about how right are his/her ethical foun-
dations.  It is neither Levinas nor Marcus who traumatizes.  They are the reminders who show 
how the Other can ethically puncture and deflate our egos by her presence, saying, ‚Here I 
am. Do not do violence. Do not reduce me. My value is not from your judgments.  My rights 
come before yours.‛ 
Third, Marcus attends to those common issues of living that few would dismiss as un-
important: ‚being a good parent,‛ ‚caring for a dying parent,‛ ‚sustaining adult-to-adult 
love,‛ ‚developing an adult religious outlook,‛ ‚reading a sacred book,‛ ‚getting help 
through psychotherapy,‛ ‚risking self-sabotage in gossip,‛ ‚eating well,‛ and, in the first 
chapter, ‚caring for a pet,‛ where he delightfully sets the tone for all the others.       
Fourth, he offers lay-people insights into their struggles with common issues.  Earlier, 
in Being for the Other: Emmanuel Levinas, Ethical Living and Psychoanalysis (Milwaukee, WI: 
Marquette University Press, 2008), Marcus explicitly addressed psychotherapists.  In In Search 
of the Good Life he writes about the art of living that ‚good life‛ which we all so dearly want.  
In both books he brings Freud and Levinas together by asking universal questions: are we 
humans (especially am I) only self-centered, or am I authentically concerned about others?  He does 
not put Freud in charge of the first and Levinas of its alternative.  Marcus does not label Freud 
the pessimistic realist and Levinas the utopian idealist.  Both are far more complex.  Freud, the 
philosopher of pleasure, wanted his clients to be responsible. Levinas, the philosopher of 
responsibility, offered rich descriptions of the psyche justifiably enjoying goods privately at 
home unconcerned about responsibility.  We are all Freudians and all Levinasians: all enjoy 
filling our needs and are all interrupted by the command to do the right thing for others: we 
respond at a cost to ourselves.  
The fifth appeal of Marcus is his scholarship.  He has not only mined Freud and Levi-
nas, but also other analysts and philosophers.  He turns to poets and lyricists, novelists and 
historians, sociologists and economists; he has taken examples from business, medicine, aca-
demia, and from the gratuitous giving and greedy grabbing at the street level.  Best of all, he 
offers us vignettes from his therapeutic practice.   
Let us be a bit more specific about the nine chapters.  In Chapter one, ‚I’m just wild 
about Harry,‛ Marcus is most convincing describing his love for his dog as more than some-
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thing to fill his need.  Levinas does not offer a philosophy of nature for equal animal rights.  
Their ontological status is at best loved companions, at worst prey for sport, mostly part of the 
glorious web of nature sustaining and sometimes threatening us on the only earth we have. 
Looking into his eyes, Harry provides Marcus with more than pleasure, is more than a com-
panion and guard-dog; he fulfils that friendship described by Aristotle as one of excellence, 
one between ‚…two virtuous people wishing the best for one another.‛ (7)  Marcus’s ethical 
assignment is not only to feed, water, and walk.  He finds himself unexpectedly blind-sided by 
a healthy love relationship that Freud noted as containing three interrelated features: 1) an 
other-directed and other-regarding, wanting to keep Harry happy for his sake, 2) a maturity 
that is not infantile, dependent, and needy, but recognizes that Harry’s needs and wishes are 
worthy of gratification, 3) an affection not marred by aggression, not ambivalent between 
friendly and hostile.  Levinas adds to Freud’s love the call to responsibility, purpose, and mea-
ning that describes the deeper foundation for his Harry-love.  The face of Harry turned toward 
him assigns Marcus’s distinct presence as responsible, without being able to reduce Harry to 
the one for whom he is responsible.  Harry is an enigma that calls up in him a kind of non-
conscious moral desire, a primordial stirring in his soul.  Harry’s vulnerability, weakness, and 
suffering makes Marcus a hostage morally obligated to enhance this ‚pup’s‛ life with the 
fullness of his whole being.   
Chapter Two, ‚Victory through vegetables,‛ is the least convincing for me.  Vegetaria-
nism is laudable for improving one’s health, rejecting inhumane treatment of animals, avoi-
ding the exploitation of nature, saving and sharing grain with humans rather than feeding and 
slaughtering stock animals.  I don’t eat much meat, but am not persuaded that Levinas’s ethics 
can philosophically and directly justify not eating meat and its products.  For him the face of 
the Other human calls the self to place its majesty above the self.  The animal’s life is dignified 
and worthy in itself, but not equal to the Other.  (I may be prejudiced having grown up on a 
Western ranch with beef, pork, poultry, mutton, milk, eggs, cheese.  We treated our animals 
humanely and fed them organically.)   
Possibly the most touching is Chapter Three: ‚Long night’s journey into day: on ten-
ding to a dying mother.‛  Making public the eulogy he gave for his mother is brave and gene-
rous.  He noted her genius for living in brutal honesty with her shortcomings and heaped-on 
trials: ‚I take life straight,‛ she often said.  She lived literature to the end and explored ideas 
with freedom and imagination, while struggling with depression.  Marcus startles the reader 
when describing her perilous confrontation with the menacing, inescapable horror of approa-
ching death.  Levinas described death as the ultimate encounter with alterity.  From beyond, 
death threatened her like a hunted animal by a predator, who for no reason she could under-
stand, was out to get her.  Its predestined coming, but ‚not yet,‛ sadistically humiliating her in 
excruciating pain with time to know its inevitability though without a terminal date, would 
ultimately find and kill her in an unexpected attack, ambushing her from a concealed position.  
Suffering and dreadful anticipation of what more was to come made her dying a loss of self 
with its loss of world.  It is Marcus’s description of witnessing his mother die that deeply pier-
ces the reader.  He quotes a personal communication from his friend, Richard Cohen, to make 
his point:   
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 Levinas rejects Heidegger’s analysis of being as being-toward-death, arguing that the death 
that matters most and cuts most deeply into my own psyche is not my own but the other’s.  
Furthermore, it is not the other’s death per se, but the other’s mortality, meaning the other’s 
aging and suffering, the other’s vulnerability that calls me to myself as responsibility for the 
other, responsible ‘not to let him die alone.’ (37)  
 
Chapter Seven, ‚On feeling altogether miserable: getting help through Psychotherapy‛ will 
likely shake the heads of some fellow therapists.  He asks and answers without moral judg-
ment:   
 
Que.: ‚What’s the problem?‛ Ans.: radical self-absorption, a psyche utterly trapped in his 
own psychological skin ethically disabled in responses of feeling, thought, and action to the 
call of the Other.  Que.: ‚How did the problem develop?‛  Ans.: parental inadequacy, in-
sufficient love, and other harmful-to self experiences suffocating with inordinate narcissistic 
needs.  Que.: ‚How to fix the problem?‛ Ans.: moving the analysand from being exclusively 
‚for-itself‛ to one-responsible-for-the-Other. (135) 
 
In this way he deconstruct self-deception, isolation, and defensiveness against appropriate 
guilt, shame, remorse, self-reproach for their misdeeds for Others. (134)  
I could reach into his four other chapters to pull out more brilliant analysis for good 
living using the light of Levinas, but you get the point by now.  Here is a book that as the 
back cover explains puts to work a ‚…philosophy and applies it to the everyday lives of 
‘real’ people struggling to give greater meaning and purpose, especially ethical meaning, to 
their personal lives.‛  What analytic insights have I left for the reader to find in In Search of 
the Good Life?  A brilliant Chapter Four: ‚On reading a sacred book: the wisdom of 
Ecclesiastes and its signifycance for psychoanalysis;‛ a powerful motivator for our most 
consequential tasks in Chapter Six: ‚The life and soul of good parenting: on wanting, having, 
and raising children;‛ a hopeful Chapter Eight: ‚All you need is love: on the difficulties of 
sustaining an adult-to-adult love relationship;‛ and finally an inspirational Chapter Nine: 
‚Looking for God in all the right places: on developing an ‘adult’ religious outlook.‛   
I strongly recommend this book to all who want for themselves and others happiness 
in a good life.  Marcus and his philosopher, Levinas, are not self-help gurus.  Their brutal ho-
nesty can show the reader how she/he will be traumatized, make her/him feel guilty, inade-
quate to fulfil the call to responsibility, all for the purpose of making a good life better by de-
centering and re-centering.   
Here is a passage from Marcus reading Levinas reading Dostoevsky’s Alexey Kara-
mazov reading notes of the dying Father Zossima: ‚We are all guilty of all and responsible 




                                                 
5 The quote is from Emmanuel Levinas, Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Phillippe Nemo.  Translated by 
Richard A. Cohen from Ethique et Infini (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1985). 
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